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Abstract 
 
What lessons might we learn from the chip cards used for payments in Europe, now that 
America’s adopting them too?  
Introduction 
 
Americans are starting to get new credit cards with an embedded chip as well as the magnetic 
strip that has been in use since the 1970s. Named for its promoters Europay, MasterCard and 
Visa, the EMV system augments the old magnetic strip cards with a chip that can authenticate a 
transaction using cryptography – a so called “smart card”. EMV was deployed in the UK from 
2003–6 and in other European countries shortly afterwards; it’s now been rolled out from India 
to Canada. The idea was to cut fraud drastically; but reality turned out to be somewhat harder 
than theory. As the graph shows, fraud in the UK went up, then down, and is now heading 
upwards again. 
 
 
 
The idea behind EMV is simple enough. The card is authenticated by a chip that’s a lot harder 
to forge than the magnetic strip. The cardholder may be identified by a signature as before, or 
by a PIN; the chip has the ability to verify the PIN locally. Banks in the UK decided to use PIN 
verification wherever possible, so the system there is branded “chip and PIN”; in Singapore, it’s 
“chip and signature” as banks decided to continue using signatures at the point of sale. America 
looks like being a mixture, with some banks issuing chip-and-PIN cards and others going down 
the signature route. We may therefore be about to see a large natural experiment as to whether 
it’s better to authenticate transactions with a signature or a PIN. 
 
The key question will be, “better for whom?” The European experience suggests that this will 
not be a straight fight between the fraudsters and everyone else. The interests of banks, 
merchants, regulators, vendors and consumers clash in interesting ways; the outcome won’t just 
be determined by how the fraudsters adapt to the technology, but by a complex tussle over who 
pays for the upgrade and who enjoys the benefits. Fraud savings are not the biggest game in 
town; while fraud costs America $3–4 billion, interchange fees are a whopping $30 billion and 
EMV will likely have an impact on both. 
 
Attacks 
 
Although US banks are issuing EMV cards now, it will be some time before they start to see a 
reduction in fraud. Cards will still have the magnetic strip and banks will continue to accept 
magnetic strip transactions because it will take many years to upgrade all the ATMs and shop 
terminals. EMV terminals still process unencrypted card numbers, expiry dates and PINs, so if 
hacked (as occurred in the 2014 Target data breach), criminals can steal enough data to 
perform fraudulent online purchases. Also, as many chip cards still contain a full unencrypted 
copy of the magnetic strip data, the criminals can steal this. If they can get  the PIN too, they 
can make forged cards and use them at an ATM. 
 
EMV also introduces some new vulnerabilities. The first-wave EMV cards in the UK were cheap 
cards capable only of Static Data Authentication (SDA), where the card contains a certificate 
signed by the bank attesting the card data are genuine. Since this certificate is static, it is trivial 
to copy it to a counterfeit chip, which can be programmed to accept any PIN – a so-called 
“Yes-card”. Criminals exploited this flaw at a small scale in France, but elsewhere it was not a 
serious problem. The Yes-card attack can be defeated by online transactions where the 
merchant contacts the bank to verify that the card computed a correct message authentication 
code on the transaction data. (This uses a key shared between the card and the issuing bank, 
so the merchant must be online for the code to be checked.) More modern EMV cards also 
support Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) which uses asymmetric cryptography and defeats 
the Yes-card attack even for offline transactions. It is likely that US-issued EMV cards will 
support DDA and the vast majority of transactions will be online anyway, so the Yes-card attack 
is unlikely to be a major issue in the USA. 
 
A much more serious type of fraud in the UK was tampering with Chip and PIN terminals to 
record card details and customer PINs. Although terminals were certified to be tamper resistant, 
they weren’t, and the certification process was seriously flawed [2]. Criminals were able to 
modify terminals on a large scale to collect customer details as the card sent them to the 
terminal, and the PIN entered by the customer as it was sent to the card for verification. 
Because most UK cards stored a copy of the magnetic strip on the chip, criminals could then 
make fake magnetic-strip ATM cards. Before the use of chip and PIN in the UK, customers 
signed for store transactions and PINs were only used at ATMs, so tampering with a store 
terminal didn’t yield enough information to withdraw cash from an ATM. Chip and PIN changed 
that; as merchants started accepting PINs at the point of sale, card forgery became easier and 
more prevalent. As the graph shows, counterfeit card fraud went up after EMV was deployed, 
and took five years for it to fall back to the previous level. So US banks can expect a lot of 
attacks using compromised or counterfeit terminals until they can start turning off magnetic-strip 
fallback mode. 
 
Another attack we worried about in the early days of EMV was the “relay attack”. This exploits 
the fact that while the card authenticates itself to the merchant terminal, the customer doesn’t 
know which terminal the card is communicating with. If a customer inserts her card into a fake 
terminal, it can relay a transaction with a quite different terminal. So a crook, Bob, can set up a 
fake parking meter in New York, and when an unwitting cardholder Alice uses it, Carol (who’s 
colluding with Bob) can stroll into Dave’s jewelry store in San Francisco and buy a diamond 
using a fake card connected to the reader in the parking meter. The poor cardholder thinks she 
paid $20 for a parking space, and gets a statement showing she spent $2,000 in a store she 
never visited. The counterfeit card inserted into the genuine terminal simply relays the 
transaction back to the genuine card via the fake terminal (see Figure 1). While there’s no real 
defence against the relay attack, it doesn’t scale well, so is likely only going to be used against 
high-value targets. 
 
 
Figure 1: The relay attack 
 
A more serious vulnerability is the No-PIN attack [1]. Here a criminal who has stolen a card but 
doesn’t know the correct PIN can put a small electronic device between the stolen card and the 
terminal and use it with any PIN he likes. The device tricks the card into believing it’s doing a 
chip and signature transaction while making the terminal believe that the card accepted the PIN 
that was entered. This attack works against all types of card, and even for online transactions. 
Fixing it properly would require a change to the EMV protocol, which would take years to agree. 
In the meantime it is often possible for the card-issuing bank to detect the the attack by carefully 
comparing the card’s version of the transaction with the terminal’s. So far it appears that only 
one UK bank is trying to do so. In the meantime French criminals have been caught exploiting a 
more sophisticated variant of this attack in the wild. 
 
The latest family of attacks, seen in the last two or three years in Spain, exploits a classic 
cryptographic vulnerability – the way in which EMV systems generate and use random 
numbers. When a terminal initiates an EMV transaction, it sends the card not just the date and 
the amount but a random number, so that each transaction is different and a crook cannot 
simply replay old transactions. However there are two flaws in this system. The first is an 
implementation flaw: it turns out that some ATMs generate predictable “random” numbers, so an 
attacker who has temporary access to someone else’s card (say, a waiter in a Mafia-owned 
restaurant) can calculate an authentication code that he can use at some predictable time in the 
future at a known ATM. Worse, there is a design flaw in that the terminal does not transmit its 
choice of random number to the bank in an authenticated way. This means for example that if a 
terminal is running malicious software, it can harvest from a customer’s card a series of 
authentication codes which it can then use to make extra transactions in the future, and it can fix 
up the random numbers in the protocol so that the issuing bank doesn’t notice anything 
suspicious [3]. This is a serious attack because it can scale; a crime gang that managed to 
install malware on a number of legitimate terminals (as happened in the Target case) could 
harvest authentication codes to authorise large numbers of transactions at businesses under its 
control. 
 
Finally, the elephant in the room with EMV deployment is card-not-present (CNP) fraud 
(Internet, phone and mail-order purchases). Although CNP fraud was low when EMV started to 
be deployed in the UK, it had grown to over half of UK card fraud by the time the roll-out was 
complete. EMV does almost nothing to stop CNP fraud (cards were never designed to be 
connected to customer PCs, even if smart card readers were to become prevalent) and so the 
crooks’ initial reaction to the EMV deployment was just to take their business online, as we can 
see from the graph. US banks would be well advised to invest in further measures to mitigate 
CNP fraud rather than putting their entire security budget into deploying EMV. EMVCo (the 
consortium which maintains the EMV standard) has already started work on a “tokenization” 
specification, allowing CNP transactions to be performed with limited-use tokens (in effect, 
one-time credit-card numbers) rather than a static credit card number, so reducing the damage 
resulting from merchant data breaches or malware on customer PCs. Tokenization has almost 
nothing to do with EMV chips, but rather than setting up an new industry body, the banks have 
drafted in EMVCo to deal with it. 
The business battleground 
 
When credit cards were first introduced by Diners’ Club in the 1960s, they had high fees; 
typically the merchant paid the bank 6% or more of transactions. The emergence in the 1970s 
of the Visa-MasterCard duopoly stabilised things with standard contracts for banks and 
merchants, technical standards so their computers could swap data, and standard fees at 2.5% 
for credit cards and 1.5% for debit. This enabled a huge expansion of the industry, and cards 
became the standard way to pay for items costing more than a few dollars. Card transaction 
processing has become a huge money-spinner for the banking industry, especially as the clunky 
old addressograph machines for taking paper imprints were replaced by cheaper online 
systems, and as card payments spread online too. Many merchants see the card industry as an 
exploitative cartel, in need of trustbusting or competitive innovation.  In 2005 merchants filed a 
class-action suit against Visa and Mastercard; a settlement in 2013 lowered fees by 0.1% and 
allowed merchants to charge customers the higher costs of credit-card transactions (which they 
already do in Europe). There has also been legislative action, with the Durbin amendment to the 
Dodd-Frank bill empowering the Federal Reserve to write the rules for fees on debit card 
transactions. 
 
The sums involved are large. A retailer like Walmart, for example, takes over $200bn in 
credit-card sales; if these customers could be moved to PIN-based debit card transactions, that 
would save $2bn in fees. So some retailers have strongly supported the move to EMV. At the 
same time, the versions of the EMV protocol being introduced in the US to support contactless 
payments (such as where your credit card becomes an app on your NFC mobile phone) are 
designed to make it harder for merchants to move customers to debit card payments. These 
market dynamics are unlike those seen in Canada or Europe, where the banking industry 
motivated merchants to install EMV terminals by means of a “liability shift”: the banks changed 
their terms and conditions so that merchants were charged the cost of all customer disputes 
where a PIN was not used. Where a PIN was used, the banks would then pass the liability on to 
the cardholder, saying “Your chip was read and your PIN was used, so you must have been 
negligent or complicit.” Such a liability shift would be more difficult in the USA because the 
retailers’ lobby is as powerful as the banks, and because consumer protection is better 
entrenched in US regulation. 
 
Yet consumer protection may be undermined in a multitude of ways. One example is the 
protocol used to decide how to authenticate the cardholder. According to the EMV standards, 
each card has a cardholder verification method (CVM) list which states a preference such as 
‘first, signature; then PIN’; the terminal should read this and use the highest-ranked method it 
supports. We would expect to see aggressive retailers programming their terminals to insist on a 
PIN whenever that’s supported, if (as we expect) the fee or liability for a PIN-based transaction 
is lower. In fact we have come across cases where merchants have simply lied to the banks 
about the method used. One fraud victim whose card was stolen while he was on holiday in 
Turkey was denied a refund for a charge made to his card because the merchant reported it as 
PIN-based; he managed to get a copy of the till receipt and found that the thief had in fact 
signed for the goods. If you wish to avoid this sort of problem, it is prudent to demand a card 
that only supports chip-and-signature.  
 
Indeed, as the US will be the first country with a mixture of chip-and-pin and chip-and-signature 
cards in issue, we should be able to learn a lot from the crime figures after a few years. And this 
is not just about fraud, but robbery too. Chip-and-PIN cards are typically capable of offline PIN 
verification, and European banks have issued millions of card readers which enable cardholders 
to compute authentication codes for online banking. These readers can be used by muggers to 
check whether a victim is telling the truth when they demand his PIN as well as his cards; in one 
unfortunate case, two French students were tortured to death by robbers. 
 
The most widespread problem encountered by cardholders, though is likely to be in dispute 
resolution. One of the problems thrown up by the experience in Europe is the lack of suitable 
tools for courts, arbitrators and even front-line dispute resolution staff in banks. When disputes 
arose with magnetic-strip cards, the consumer typically got the benefit of the doubt as these 
were widely known to be forgeable. EMV systems on the other hand create large amounts of log 
data which appear to be impressive but are often not understood, and can sometimes be the 
result of forgery by merchants (as in the Turkish case) or by malware on merchant terminals (as 
in the recent Target case, which would likely have been unaffected by the move to EMV). Also, 
the move from signature to PIN verification shifted dispute resolution in the banks favour. Any 
forged signature will likely be shown to be a forgery by later expert examination. In contrast, if 
the correct PIN was entered the fraud victim is left in the impossible position of having to prove 
that he did not negligently disclose it. 
 
The main lesson to be learned here is that the collection, analysis and presentation of evidence 
is a function that needs to be specified, tested and debugged like any other. Simply dumping 
many pages of printout on a court and leaving it to an expert to pore through the digits, 
comparing them with EMV manuals, is not a robust way to do things; often the necessary 
evidence isn’t even retained. The forensic procedures also need to be open and transparent to 
stand up in court, and their governance needs to be improved; this problem cannot just be left to 
a disparate vendor community [5]. Here some guidance from the Fed would be welcome. 
Conclusions 
 
The EMV protocol is not a rigid way of doing card payments so much as a toolkit with which 
banks can build systems that can be pretty secure, but which can also be pretty awful. There is 
good news, and bad news. The good news is that EMV systems have been deployed in Europe 
for eleven years now, and there is a lot of experience to build on. Almost everything that could 
go wrong, has gone wrong: several protocol flaws which allowed attacks nobody had 
anticipated; tamper-resistance that didn’t work; certification schemes that turned out to be a 
sham; and evidence-collection systems that were not fit for purpose. These should not just be 
academic case studies for security engineering classes, but should be studied by engineers 
who want to build robust payment systems. 
 
The bad news is that the interests of banks, merchants, vendors, cardholders and regulators 
diverge in significant ways. In Europe, many failures were down to banks dumping liability on 
merchants and cardholders, who were in no position to defend themselves. In the US, the 
dynamic is different and more complex, with the main fight being over the interchange fees that 
the merchants pay the banks for processing their transactions. These fees are an order of 
magnitude greater than the fraud is, so we may find that the security of the system will be a 
side-effect of the project rather than its main goal. The details may be fought over for years to 
come in the courts and by lobbyists in Washington. 
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